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Operation ''Canada'' 
5th Canadian Ar111oured 
Division's Attack on Delfzijl, 
23 April to 2 May 1945 
Daniel Byers 
Operation "Canada" was the last action fought by 5th Canadian Armoured Division in the 
Second World War. The battle to open the 
northern Dutch port of Delfzijllasted ten days, 
and cost the Division a total of 62 dead and 180 
wounded. Yet it has largely been forgotten. 1 The 
capture of Delfzijl is interesting enough to be 
worth studying in its own right. As one of the 
last Canadian actions in the war, it reveals the 
level of proficiency achieved by Canadian soldiers 
by that time. The reduction of the pocket was 
carried out with a high degree of efficiency, and 
saw excellent cooperation between all combat 
arms. It is also a useful reminder that for many 
Canadians the costly fighting did not end in 
North-West Europe until the very last days of the 
war. 
The battle for Delfzijl also raises two 
questions: why was it undertaken so close to 
the end of the war. and why did commanders 
continue to advance in the face of strong 
opposition that was detected early in the 
operation? The aim of this article is to address 
these questions, as well as describing the battle 
itself in some detail. As it argues. the reduction 
of the pocket was authorized due to a 
combination of strategic and operational factors. 
It was continued after the strength of the defences 
became evident because once the troops were in 
range of the pocket's defences it was less costly 
to press ahead and finish the task, at least in 
the eyes of Canadian commanders, than to 
conduct a longer holding operation or siege. 
* * * * * 
D elfzijl is located on the coast of the Ems Estuary, facing the German port of Emden. 
As one of Holland's largest secondary ports, it 
looked promising to military planners for use in 
relieving the starving Dutch population following 
the "hunger winter" of 1944-1945. 2 At first glance 
it seemed easier to capture than ports in the west 
of the country, where German occupiers had 
retreated behind prepared defences against the 
advancing Canadians. In addition, heavy guns 
at Delfzijl protected the approaches to Emden, 
a potential base for last-ditch operations by£-
boats, midget submarines, and other naval 
weapons should Germany continue to resist 
defeat, as it had so far. 3 Emden was a strategic 
target for Allied planners, and more importantly 
for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, which was 
then advancing towards it. 5th Division's 
operations were designed to support that 
advance by putting constant pressure on Delfzijl. 
to prevent the defenders from retreating to 
reinforce Emden.~ Thus, the attack on Delfzijl 
was motivated at the strategic level by several 
factors, which combined to make its capture an 
important aim. 
Unfortunately, the closing of the pocket was 
complicated by orders designed to protect Dutch 
inhabitants. Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister, 5th 
Division's GOC (General Officer Commanding), 
was asked to mount the operation using nothing 
more powerful than his usual infantry support 
weapons: tanks, 25-pounder artillery, and 3-inch 
mortars. 5 Against these were ranged four troops 
oflarge enemy guns from 256 Naval Anti-Aircraft 
Battery, which were located near Delfzijl, and at 
the "Reider Spit" to the south and east. All were 
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now turned inland to protect the pocket. Several 
concentrations of smaller calibre artillery were 
identified between Delfzijl and the town of 
Farmsum, while heavy coastal guns were sighted 
to fire into the area from as far away as Emden 
and the North Sea island of Borkum. 6 
Besides opposition guns, Intelligence Officers 
identified at least 1500 German defenders 
around Delfzijl, mostly naval fortress troops 
converted to infantry, located in small battle 
groups of 80-120 men at various strong points. 
Experience would prove the total to be more than 
4000, not including men killed or evacuated to 
Emden during the battle. 7 Intelligence reports 
compared the task of taking Delfzijl to that of 
the "Breskens Pocket" in the Scheidt Estuary at 
Antwerp, one of the Canadian Army's worst 
battles of the previous autumn. 8 The terrain 
around Delfzijl was similar to the Scheidt. 
consisting of soft polderland crossed by 
numerous drainage ditches and canals. All 
vehicles were limited to the weak. narrow roads 
of the region, and there was little cover anywhere. 
Much of the area west ofDelfzijl had been flooded 
by the Germans, and the pocket was ringed by a 
prepared system of mines and trenches, linking 
strong points centred on local villages. 9 
A tactical problem faced Brigadier Ian S. 
Johnston, the Commanding Officer of 11th 
36 
A gathering qf generals at 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division 
Headquarters. 20 March 1945. 
Left to right: Brigadier I.H. 
Cumberland. commander. 5th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade: 
Major-General B.M. 
Hoffmeister; GOC 5th 
Canadian Armoured Division: 
unknown: Field Marshal B.L. 
Montgomery. commander: 21st 
Army Group; unknown: 
Lieutenant-General C. Foullces. 
GOC I Canadian Corps: 
Brigadier l.S. Johnston. 
commander; 11 th Canadian 
lrlfantry Brigade. 
Canadian Infantry Brigade. and the immediate 
commander of the operation. Considering the 
number of enemy troops. the long frontage that 
would have to be manned, and the artillery 
superiority of his opponents, Johnston chose to 
begin his attack on Delfzijl as soon as possible. 
As he later put it. 
There was little cover, the weather was miserable 
and the enemy shelling was taking it's [sic] toll 
of casualties. It was accordingly decided to push 
forward to at least reduce the pocket immediately 
with the reservation that as the picture developed 
a pause could be made later when more troops 
could be rested. '0 
Tactical considerations, then, reinforced 
strategic ones in the decision to proceed with 
the reduction ofDelfzijl. Although 3rd Division's 
matching advance on Emden actually went more 
slowly than planned over the next few days, 
Brigadier Johnston was forced by his local 
situation to proceed with his own attack. He had 
no way to know how close the war was to ending, 
or the true number of men that his own soldiers 
faced, and he planned his battle accordingly. 
The two commanders of the operation, 
Hoffmeister and Johnston, were well-qualified 
to assess the dangers. Hoffmeister was one of 
three prewar militia officers who rose to the rank 
of Major-General during the war. after going 
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overseas as a company commander with the 
Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver in 1939. He 
took over as Commanding Officer of the unit in 
October 1942, and by March 1944 rose to 
command 5th Division. Hoffmeister led the 
"Mighty Maroon Machine" through the rest of 
their battles in Italy, before they moved to North-
West Europe in early 1945. A recent study of 
Canada's Second World War generals calls 
Hoffmeister "the best Canadian fighting general 
of the war. "11 Brigadier Johnston was also a 
veteran of many years in the prewar militia. He 
mobilized in 1939 with the 48th Highlanders of 
Toronto. going from Regimental Adjutant to 
Commanding Officer by 1943. and taking 
command of 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade in 
June 1944. 12 Thus. both men were competent. 
battle-hardened commanders. who knew their 
jobs, while remembering what combat was like 
for the average infantryman. Neither was likely 
to attack Delfzijl unless convinced of the need, 
and both did all they could to reduce the costs. 
When asked to conduct operations without heavy 
artillery. Hoffmeister reportedly consulted his 
men down to the level of the other ranks 
regarding their willingness to carry out the task. 13 
To avoid enemy artillery. Hoffmeister and 
Johnston directed that the operation be carried 
out as much as possible as a night attack. 
To fight the battle, Johnston had under 
command four infantry battalions: the Cape 
Breton Highlanders. the Perth Regiment, the Irish 
Regiment. and the Westminster Regiment (5th 
Division's motorized infantry). In support 
Johnston could call on the guns of 8th Self-
Brigadier I. H. Cumberland. 5111 
Canadian Armoured Brigade. 
checlcing a map wiih 
Lieuienant.-Colonel G.C. ~ 
Corbauli. Westminster 
Regiment and Lieut.enani-
Colonel Jack Eaton. 8th New 
Brunswick Hussars. 
Propelled and 17th Field Regiments, and two 
out of three armoured regiments in the Division, 
the British Columbia Dragoons and the 8th 
Hussars. For the first two days, the fighting was 
led by Brigadier I.H. Cumberland of 5th 
Canadian Armoured Brigade, who ordered the 
Westminsters and Irish to take over positions in 
the villages of Siddeburen and Oostwolde to the 
south of Delfzijl, while the Perths dug in to the 
north. Johnston formally took command on the 
morning of April 25, by which time all three 
battalions were fully involved in combat. 
* * * * * 
T he battle for Delfzijl began at 11:00 p.m. on the evening of April 23. Two platoons of the 
Perth Regiment's "C" Company moved off from 
Godlinze towards the east, capturing the villages 
of Groote Nes and Klein Nes before pressing on 
to their objectives on the coast. They arrived at 
dawn, just as German artillery zeroed in on their 
position. Meanwhile, "B" Company advanced 
south-east towards Holwierde, but soon ran into 
enemy opposition outside the village. Road-
bound tanks ofthe British Columbia Dragoons' 
Reconnaissance Troop. which were supporting 
the Perths, were unable to reach them. Held up 
by fire from self-propelled guns and other 
artillery north-west of Nansum, the company 
could only move forward again at 9:30 a.m., 
when supporting mortars fired smoke and high 
explosives to cover them. The company finally 
reached the edge of Holwierde at about 10:15. 
Occupying a village was dangerous work, and 
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enemy artillery continued to inflict casualties 
throughout the afternoon. Enemy patrols also 
probed the lines during the afternoon and again 
near midnight. 14 
To the south, the Irish Regiment was relieving 
3rd Division's Canadian Scottish Regiment in 
Wagenborgen. Waiting to be relieved, the Scottish 
had not pressed forward, and the rest of the town 
had to be cleared by the Irish. with the aid of 
two troops of tanks from the 8th Hussars. 15 
Farther east, the Westminsters took over from 
the Royal Winnipeg Rifles in Oostwolde, 
accompanied by two more Hussars troops. At 
38 
Above: Soldiers of the Perlh Regiment 
marching to the Jronl, April 1 945 
Left: Privates V.R. Davis. D.C. Wragg 
and J.M. Cunningham of lhe Perth 
Regiment rest during the 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division advance. April 1945 
6:00 p.m. on April 24. "A" and "C" companies 
moved off along the road running north from 
the village, "C" splitting off to advance along a 
canal on the right. Despite sounds of enemy 
movement and a few artillery rounds, they made 
no direct contact with the enemy, and they 
continued to move forward cautiously until l :00 
p.m. the next day, reaching a point about two 
miles south and east of Woldendorp. ](; 
The British Columbia Dragoons received one 
of their least pleasant orders on April 23. Crews 
from two squadrons were told to "dismount" and 
act as infantry in Appingedam, in the centre of 
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the pocket. "A" and "B" Squadrons left their tanks 
and formed four groups of one officer and fifteen 
men each, plus a headquarters of twenty-one. 
"C" Squadron also contributed crewmen from 
two of its troops. 17 Part of the town was still in 
German hands, and for the next ten days the 
Dragoons conducted active patrols in the face of 
heavy shelling. While one might question the use 
of troopers as infantry, there were not enough 
trained soldiers to man the entire perimeter of 
the pocket. The Dragoons were assigned a fairly 
simple holding role in the centre, in order to 
free everyday infantrymen for more active roles 
to the north and south. This is just one example 
of the many expedients on which Canadian and 
other national armies were forced to rely due to 
chronic shortages of infantry throughout the 
North-West European campaign. 
Perth Regiment - • + 
9th Cdn Armd Reg! • • • • ....... 
Cape Breton Highlanders __.. 
Irish Regiment of Canada • • • • 




Once the various units had moved into 
position around the Delfzijl perimeter, the next 
forty-eight hours were similar for all of them. 
Enemy shelling continued while plans were 
prepared for further attacks. In Appingedam, the 
British Columbia Dragoons were shelled so 
heavily that one squadron had to move its 
headquarters into an air-raid shelter, and 
communication lines were cut faster than they 
could be repaired. 18 To the north, the shelling 
was broken for small periods by the few air 
support missions that were flown during the 
Delfzijl battle. The afternoon of April 25 saw an 
attack by fighter-bombers on targets north of 
Delfzijl, although they arrived before smoke 
could be fired to mark targets, and "the bombing 
was ineffective." 19 Twenty Spitfires and Typhoons 
returned the next day, but heavy clouds and 
39 
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A Sherman Firejly. modified with extra armour. Q{ the 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division. moves through the town of Put/en. Holland. 18 April 1945. 
drizzle then set in across the region, becoming a 
constant feature for the rest of the fighting. ~0 At 
the same time. troops were happy to welcome 
the 109th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment. Royal 
Artillery, to the area south-west of Appingedam, 
in an attempt to match the enemy's superior 
guns. They were soon joined by one battery from 
1st Heavy Regiment, R.A. 21 
The period April 26-27 saw fighting resume 
for all units in the Delfzijl pocket. The first to 
advance were the Irish to the south, who moved 
out of Wagenborgen in mid-afternoon on the 
26th, facing little direct opposition but heavy 
artillery fire. "C" Company passed through the 
lead company, "A", at about 4:30. and continued 
along the road to Heveskes until 6:00p.m. "D" 
Company then moved off on the left, struggling 
forward against strong opposition until 11:00 
p.m., when all three companies dug in. 22 
To the north, the Perth Regiment's attack 
began shortly after. "D" Company led off at 12:35 
a.m., followed closely by "C". and both were near 
the coast of the Ems Estuary by 4:00 a.m. "D" 
Company then began to face increasing small 
arms fire. 8th Hussars tanks arrived to help, 
and together they reached their objective. Strong 
resistance continued, and one tank was knocked 
out. The company commander made two 
40 
requests for additional armour over the next two 
hours, before the enemy finally surrendered the 
position, along with forty-two prisoners. The 
tanks continued to be exposed to heavy artillery 
fire for some time thereafter. 2 :1 
While the Perths were advancing in the north, 
a Westminster attack was getting underway at 
the other end of the perimeter. Covered by 
massed guns of supporting tanks, 17th Field 
Regiment, and six new 105-mm Hussars tanks 
dug in as artillery, "A" Company passed right 
through Woldendorp before their opponents 
recovered. They were promptly cut off, and 
trapped for the rest of the day. Thai evening. a 
counter-attack came in from all sides, and the 
company only survived the hour-long battle 
thanks to supporting fire from their own artillery 
and tanks, and captured German arms that they 
pressed into service. "C" Company launched an 
attack on Woldendorp two hours later. taking 
the rest of the night to reach their comrades. 
Together, the survivors resisted another counter-
attack. and the two companies began to clear 
the town. They were heavily shelled, but managed 
to complete their task by noon. 24 
As the Westminsters attempted to free their 
men in Woldendorp on the night of April27 /28, 
on the left two companies of the Irish began 
6
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Canadian armour. including a Sherman "Flail'' tank, receives a warm 
welcome as it passes through the streets of Putten. Holland, 18 April 1945. 
another advance. "C" Company forced its way 
through wire and considerable opposition 
throughout the night, first light finding them 500 
yards short of Heveskes. Meanwhile, "A" 
Company moved off to the north-east, following 
a canal that ended at Termunterzijl on the coast. 
As they approached their objectives, small arms 
fire increased, and the company was suddenly 
surrounded. Only one platoon escaped the trap 
that had been laid, and the rest ofthe company 
found itself in the same position as that of the 
Westminsters the day before. 25 
To the north, the same night saw the Perths 
launch a complicated four-company assault on 
Nansum. "C" Company moved off at about 1:00 
a.m., heading towards the heavy guns that had 
shelled them for days. Unfortunately, the men 
were trapped in a minefield about two hours 
later, the Company Commander and Lieutenant 
killed by the first mines. Patrols could not find a 
gap before daybreak, and the whole Nansum 
attack was delayed. All companies were heavily 
shelled during the morning by enemy guns, 
which were now firing at almost point-blank 
range. ''D" Company finally managed to move 
again at 3:15 that afternoon. Meeting slight 
opposition, they called down their own artillery, 
and ruthlessly set fire to houses to drive out 
German defenders and maintain their advance. 
They were finally halted by German artillery and 
a self-propelled gun at about 4:30. Smoke was 
fired over the positions, and one platoon 
struggled onto the company's objectives. The 
battalion's leading platoon drew up just short of 
the Nansum guns at 7:15p.m., and the reserve 
company was ordered to pass through. At 10:00 
p.m. they, too, called for smoke, and twenty-five 
minutes later they requested artillery fire to 
neutralize the guns. "C" Company finally took 
the fortified position at about 10:45 on the 
evening of April 28, capturing 117 prisoners in 
the process. 26 
The capture of Nansum was completed 
overnight. "A" Company led the advance, but had 
a difficult time crossing the last 300-400 yards 
in front of the town. They were stopped by a 
machine gun at about 1:45 a.m., and remained 
200 yards short of Nansum four hours later, 
when they called for more ammunition. A 
counter-attack followed shortly after. Although 
they were never cut off, the men of"A" Company 
were forced to rely on captured weapons and 
ammunition to hold their position, just as the 
Westminsters thirty-three hours earlier. 
Supporting artillery fire helped to end the fight, 
and the company's ammunition lines were re-
opened. It was not until 2:30p.m. that the last 
of the day's obstacles were overcome and the 
41 
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~~~ die Verteidiger vom 
Kessel Delfziil 
Himmler hat heute den Allierten bedin 
gungslose Kapitulation angeboten um weiteres 
unniitzes blutvergieszen zu vermeiden. 
Wir Kanadier nehmen an, dasz lhr bis jetzt 
noch keine Ahnung davon habt. 
Der Krieg ist praktisch aus. 
lhre Pflicht ist getan. 
Schickt einen Parlementar mit der 
weissen Flagge heri.iber zum 
Zeichen der Uebergabe. 
advance on Nansum resumed. Artillery fire was 
directed on the village. and "A'' Company finally 
entered it at 4:50p.m. Patrols continued to meet 
opposition for the next hour. Meanwhile, "C" and 
"D" companies spent the day clearing the 
recently-captured coastal guns and the area 
between Holwierde and Nansum. In all, the 
Regiment took 295 prisoners for the day, and 
its men were ready for a well-deserved rest when 
the Cape Breton Highlanders relieved them that 
evening, in preparation for the final attack on 
Delfzijl. "D" Company stayed in action for the 
time being, taking over "B" Company positions 
in HolwierdeY 
That night, the British Columbia Dragoons 
launched their most complicated and potentially 
dangerous operation of the battle, a combined 
infantry-armoured attack to link up with the 
Perths. All available tanks were enlisted to 
support the assaulting troopers, and 
Reconnaissance and even Headquarters tanks 
were pressed into action to fill out the order of 
battle. The force headed off at 10:15 p.m., 
moving north and then turning to come in on 
the town ofMarsum from the west, "after liberally 
42 
Thirty thousand leqfiets Wee this one werefired 
into the Delfz!jl pocket in specially modified 
smoke shells on 29 April. The translation reads: 
To the defenders of the Delfzijl Pocket. 
Himmler has today offered unconditional 
surrender to the Allies to prevent further 
unnecessary bloodshed. 
We Canadians assume that up to 
now you don't know about this. 
The War is practically over. 
You have done your duty. 
Send a representative over with a white 
flag as a sign of your surrender. 
The appeal was apparently unsuccessful. 
[From the War Diary. 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division HQ. May 1945. App. 1 I 1 A.] 
shooting it up. "28 Despite their preparations the 
Dragoons were quite happy to find the town 
abandoned, although it was heavily shelled as 
soon as they entered it. One troop of tanks was 
sent towards Holwierde to contact the Perths, 
closing the ring in the northern half of the 
pocket. 29 
To the south the Delfzijl perimeter was 
closing as well. The Westminsters launched an 
attack towards the coast before midnight, and 
"B" Company found itself 1000 yards short of 
Termunterzijl by first light. They chose to risk 
running across the final stretch of open polder 
rather than staying in their exposed positions. 
By 5:15a.m. the company was firmly in town 
and patrolling towards the water, having closed 
a major evacuation centre. and trapping about 
500 German prisoners. To the right. "A" 
Company took control of the town ofTermunten 
a short time later, and began patrolling east to 
the Reider Spit, the battalion's last objective. 
That afternoon "C" Company moved to within 
sight of German crews loading and firing the guns 
that tormented the Westminsters. The position 
was well-defended by mines. wire. and concrete. 
8
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however, and the only friendly artillery were six 
105-mm Hussars tanks, and one 7.2-inch 
howitzer from 1st Heavy Regiment, R.A. The men 
were ordered to pull back to less exposed 
positions while a two-company daylight attack 
with full artillery support was prepared. 30 
By then, the Cape Breton Highlanders had 
moved into position for the final attack on 
Delfzijl. At this point it is worth remembering 
that Brigadier Johnston had hoped to rest his 
troops after reducing the perimeter of the pocket. 
But most of the guns remained active, and the 
Canadians were now in point-blank range. In the 
end, it proved less costly to have the CBH push 
on and end the battle as quickly as possible. 
Their C.O., Lt-Col R.B. Somerville, prepared an 
intricate plan for the advance on Delfzijl, which 
was to take place in several deliberate stages. 
"A" and "B" companies were to lead off and 
capture points on the coastal dyke east and 
slightly north of Uitwierde. "C" Company would 
pass through and take the battery of coastal guns 
north of Delfzijl. "D" would then continue the 
advance and seize a group of guns in the harbour, 
to be followed by an attack on the railway station 
at the northern edge of the port. From there, 
troops would clear the town itself. 31 The attack 
was planned to begin the night of April 29/30, 
but Somerville was forced to change plans when 
poor weather washed out roads in the rear.:32 A 
further shock came in the form of one man killed 
and two wounded as "A" Company came up to 
relieve the Perths, when a German prisoner being 
escorted to the rear accidentally stepped on a 
mine. To top off a miserable night for "A" 
Company, the weather was cold and wet, rations 
did not get through due to a bogged tank blocking 
the road, and the men were shelled during the 
night. The opposition met by the Perths in 
Nansum, and the need to clear the minefield they 
had discovered, also influenced the Cape Breton 
CO's decision to substitute an intermediate 
attack on Uitwierde, which began just before 
midnight. "A'" and "B" companies reached their 
objectives within about three hours, meeting 
moderate opposition and taking 240 prisoners 
along the way.Tl 
The CBH launched their final attack on the 
port ofDelfzijl at 10:00 p.m. on the night of April 
30.:14 "C" Company soon ran into a minefield, 
and the pioneer section went to work. The 
infantry broke free before 11:00 p.m., only to 
meet more active resistance. Forty-nine prisoners 
were taken following a short fight, and by 
midnight the men were moving ahead again. By 
morning, "D" Company got within 100 yards of 
the Delfzijl guns that were the target of their 
advance, before being pinned down short of 
ammunition. As daylight approached, enemy 
defences were clearly stronger than expected. 
The New Brunswick Hussars lost two tanks 
helping "B" Company forward, but went on 
without them to capture one of the company's 
objectives, a rare example of armour leading 
infantry onto an objective, and proof of the degree 
of cooperation achieved by units of 5th Division 
by the end of the war. 
By this point, "D" Company was urgently in 
need of help. They were still pinned down, and 
unable to send anyone back to guide in their 
ammunition. A reinforcement platoon finally 
reached them under cover of smoke, gathering 
up a stray supply party along the way. Now that 
"D" Company's position was secured, "B" was 
ordered to move on to the Delfzijl railway station, 
and another troop of Hussars tanks was sent to 
help. They reached the station at 10:14 a.m., 
and captured several hundred prisoners during 
and after their attack. It was during this advance 
that the third Military Cross of the operation was 
won. 35 Major Tim Ellis, who was temporarily 
commanding "A" Squadron, describes the action 
that won the M.C. for one of his Lieutenants: 
I sent Bill Gerrard's troop in. only to have it shot 
to a standstill part way there. Bill stood in his 
turret while the Jerries were finishing off his 
disabled tank and gave a detailed description of 
the fortifications and gun positions. camouflaged 
to look like houses, then made it safely back up 
the ditch along with his crews. :lG 
Gerrard's own gunner reportedly knocked out 
two of the three anti- tank guns that opposed 
the troop, before the crew finally evacuated the 
tank. 37 Another of the crew members, who helped 
the wounded men into the ditch, remembers that 
German machine-gunners stopped firing for a 
moment to allow them to get to safety.:;e 
By 11:20 a.m., Delfzijl had been split in two 
by the combined CBH-Sth Hussars attack. The 
remaining defenders began heading to sea in 
boats, but not before the Cape Breton 
Highlanders brought their prisoner count for the 
past three days to over 1500. To the south, 
43 
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German gunners also evacuated the Reider Spit 
overnight, the Westminsters hearing the guns go 
silent at 3:00 a.m. A freed Russian prisoner 
arrived to report that the crew had left the Spit, 
and a patrol went in to confirm the statement 
that afternoon, after smoke cleared from around 
the guns and a white flag became visible. Except 
for some shelling from Emden, a minor nuisance 
compared to the Spit guns, the rest of the 
Westminsters' day was quiet.39 
One final pocket of German troops remained, 
located between Delfzijl and Farmsum. The task 
of eliminating it fell to the Irish Regiment. "A" 
Company set off from Heveskes one minute after 
midnight on May 2, following a supporting 
artillery barrage into Weiwerd. The company 
raced through, seizing bridges on the western 
outskirts of the town before they could be 
destroyed. "C" Company soon arrived to help 
clear Weiwerd, and despite strong opposition 
they completed the task by about 3:00a.m. "B" 
company in reserve moved up and passed 
through Weiwerd two hours later. Supported 
closely by Hussars tanks, the men moved down 
the road toward Farmsum. The advance brought 
on an immediate fire fight, and opposition 
continued until 6:40 a.m., when the senior 
German leader in the pocket finally requested 
terms of surrender. Lt-Col L.H.C. Payne of the 
Irish Regiment officially accepted the 
unconditional surrender of the Delfzijl garrison 
a few minutes later. 40 
After the surrender of the last German 
defenders, the Irish, British Columbia Dragoons 
and Cape Breton Highlanders continued to clear 
the area between Appingedam and Delfzijl, 
establishing contact shortly after noon. 41 Helped 
by the German commander, German and 
Canadian engineers began clearing Delfzijl's port 
area of mines. The Canadians reportedly tore 
out demolition charges without even stopping 
to search for booby-traps. 42 Over the next two 
days. the pocket was fully cleared and units 
either pulled back to rest areas or settled down 
to coast-watching duties on the Ems Estuary. The 
long-awaited news of the German surrender in 
North-West Europe came on the evening of May 
4, and for 5th Division the war formally ended 
the next morning. 
* * * * * 
44 
D espite the late date of the Delfzijl battle. and the speed with which peace followed, the 
operation was carried out with dash and 
efficiency. Sixty-two men sacrificed their lives to 
seize the port, against formidable opposition. In 
hindsight, the usefulness of the fighting might 
be questioned. As has been argued, however, at 
the time of the attack it was made for what 
seemed to be valid reasons. Commanders hoped 
to use Delfzijl to land relief supplies, and it was 
an important defensive link to Emden, a strategic 
target where 3rd Division was still operating. 
Once units were in place around the pocket. 
enemy artillery combined with orders limiting 
the use of supporting weapons led Brigadier 
Johnston to begin his attack immediately, to 
reduce his frontage and the dangers to his troops. 
As the fighting continued it became evident that 
his position would not improve until the pocket 
was completely eliminated. and so the battle 
continued. It is only after the fact that we know 
just how near the war was to ending. Years later, 
Brigadier Johnston made a comment that 
probably best summarizes the sacrifice of the 
sixty-two men of 5th Division who gave their lives 
in late April and early May of 1945: "'They were 
determined in the capture ofDelfzijl when victory 
was in our hands and life once more was 
precious. "4 :3 
Notes 
1. The most detailed account is a brief description of 
operations in C.P. Stacey. Qfllcial History oft he CanadiCln 
Army in the Second World WClr. vol.3. The Victory 
Campaign: The Operations in Nort.h-West ELLrope. 1944-
1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 1960), pp.591-94. 
2. Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister. letter to author. I March 
1991. 
3. On Allied fears of such weapons. see Nal ional Arc!1ives 
of Canada [NAC] Record Group IRG ]24. Vol.10941. File 
245.C5023(D 1 ). "5 Cdn Armel Div: Intelligence Summary 
No. 132," 27 April I 945. Also John Ehrman. Gmnd 
Strategy, vol.1. October 1944-ALLgus/ 1945 (London: 
HMSO. 1956). pp.15-18, and F.H. Hinsley. British 
Intelligence in the Second World War: Its l!l/ILLence on 
Sl.rategy and Operations. vo1.3. pl.2 (London: HMSO. 
1988). pp.625-41. 
4. Stacey. Victory Cwnpaign. p.593. 
5. Hoffmeister to author. 18 January 1991. For comments 
on concerns for Dutch civilians. see Terry Copp. A 
Cwwdicm's GLLide to the Bollle/lelds qf" Nor/ h-West 
ELLrope (Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Mililary. Strategic. 
and Disarmament Studies. 1995). p.216. 
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss3/4
6. "5 Cdn Armel Div: Intelligence Summary No. 132." 27 
April1945. op.ciL. and NAC RG 24. Vol.l4160. War Diary 
[WD]. HQ II Canadian Infantry Brigade, April 1945. 
Appx. 6: Brigadier lan S. Johnston. "Report on 
Operations: 11 Ccln lnfBcle (for periocl20 April1945 till 
2 May 45). The Battle for Delfzijl."' 28 May 1945. p.2. 
7. The final prisoner count was l 09 officers ancl4.034 other 
ranks. NAC RG 24. Vol. 13798. WD. HQ 5th Canadian 
Armoured Division. 3 May 1945. 
8. Directorate of History and Heritage. Department of 
National Defence. Ottawa[DHH). File 112.3M1009(Dll4). 
"2 Canadian Corps Intelligence Summary." No. 160. 20 
April1945. 
9. On German p1·eparations at Delfzijl. see also Ibid., 
No.159. 18 April 1945: NAC RG 24. Vol.l0941. File 
245.C5023(D I). "5 Ccln Armel Div: Intelligence Summa1y 
No. 131." 25 April1945: and DHH 112.3M1009(D121) 
"First Canadian Army Intelligence Summary No. 300.'' 
26 April45. 
10. Johnston. "Report on Operations." pp.3-4. 
11. J.L. Granatstein. The GeneraLs: The Canadian Army's 
Senior Comnwnders in I he Second World War (Toronto: 
Stoddart. 1993). p.l80. Granatstein discusses 
Hoffmeister on pp.189-202. which are excerpted in 
Canadian Military Hisl.ory Vol.2. No.2 (Autumn 1993). 
pp.57-64. See also Stacey. Victor'!} Campaign. pp.264 and 
384: W.J. McAndrew. "Hoflineister. Bertram Meryl." 
Cwwdian Enet;dopedia. Second Edition. 1988: and 
biographical information on NAC RG 24, Vo\.10786, File 
224Cl.069(D 1 ). 
12. Ibid .. and G.W.L. Nicholson. Official History qf the 
Canadicm Army in the Second Wortd War. vol.2. 
Canadians inllatt;. 1943-1945 (Ottawa: Queen ·s Printer. 
1960). p.692. 
13. HoiTmeisLertoauthor. l March 1991. 
14. See DHJ-I 145.2P10l!(D1). Captain C. D. Hood. "Report 
on Operations of the Perth R for the periocl22 Apr to V-E 
Day." and NAC RG 24. Vol.l5137. WD. Perth Regiment. 
23-25 April !945. 
15. NAC RG 24. Vol.l5087. WD. Irish Regiment. 24 April 
1945 
16. NAC RG 24. Vo\.15283. WD. Westminster Regiment. 24-
25 April 1945 
17. NAC RG 24. Vol.! 4230. WD. 9th Canadian Armoured 
Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons). 23 April 1945. 
18. See the Dragoons' WD for 24-25 April 1945. 
19. WD. Perth Regiment. 25 April 1945. 
20. WDs. Perth Regiment and British Columbia Dragoons, 
26 April 1945. Also DHH 112.3M1009(D121). "First 
Canadian Army lnlelligence Summa1y No. 301 ... 27 April 
45. 
21. NAC RG 24. Vols. 14335 ancl14451: WDs. HQ Royal 
Canadian Artillery. 25-27 April. and 8th Field Regiment, 
27 April 1945. 
22. WD. Irish Regiment. 26 April 1945. 
23. WD. Perth Regiment. 27 April 1945. 
24. WD, Westminster Regimenl. 26-28 April 1945. 
25. WD. Irish Regiment. 28 April 1945. 
26. WD. Perth Regiment. 28 April1945. 
27. Ibid., 29 April 1945. 
28. WD. British Columbia Dragoons, 29 April 1945. 
29. Ibid. 
30. DHH 145.2W1011(Dl). Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. 
Corbould. "Report on Operations for Periocl24 Apr-! May 
1945: Operation ·canada', .. p.5. Also WD. Westminster 
Regiment. 29-30 April 1945. 
31. DHH 145.2C5013, Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Somerville. 
"Report on Operations of the Cape Breton Highlanders. 
Holland. for the period 27 March 1945 to the 8th May 
1945," p.2. 
32. Johnston, ''Report on Operations." p.8. 
33. See Somerville, ·'Report. on Opera lions." p.2 and NAC 
RG 24, Vol.15048. WD. Cape Breton Highlanders. 29-30 
April1945. 
34. The following account of the ballalion's actions is from 
their WD for Apri130-May 1. unless otherwise noted. 
35. Two Military Crosses were awarded to Forward 
Observation Officers, Captains W.T. Thompson (8th Field 
Regiment) and D.G. Pyper (17th Field Regiment). for 
actions earlier in the operation. Captain Pyper's signaller. 
Gunner David Fehr, also won a Milita1y Medal. suggesting 
both the hazards of such duties and the nature of the 
larger baUle. For further details. see G. W. L. Nicholson. 
The Gunners of Canada: The Hisl.ory of l.he Royal 
Regiment qj' Canadian Artillery. vol.2. 1919-1967 
(Toronto: McClelland and St.ewarl. 1972). p.442 fn.2. 
36. !-I.R.S. Ellis, ''Down Memory Lane: Glory Days,'' The 
Sabretache (8t.h Hussars' Regimental Association 
Newsletter). n.d. A copy of this account was kindly 
provided by Mr. Ellis in a personal lelt.er. 16 February 
1991. 
37. Douglas How. The 8th Hussars: .A HL51ory qfih.e Regimef11. 
(Sussex. NB: Maritime Publishing Company, 1964). 
pp.347-48. 
38. RobertAsht.on. telephone conversation. 7 February 1991. 
39. WD, Westminster Regiment, 30 April- I May 1945. 
40. WD. Irish Regiment. 2 May 1945. 
41. WD. Cape Breton Highlanders. 2 May 1945. 
42. Hoffmeister to author, 1 March 1991. 
43. Foreword to Stafford Johnston. The Fighting Perths 
(Stratford. ON: Perth Regiment Veterans· Association. 
1964). 
Daniel Byers is a temporary Lecturer in the 
Department of History at the Royal Military 
College of Canada. He is currently 




Byers: Operation “Canada”: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Attack on De
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998
